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Abstract
Recent research highlights the importance of biased expectations and inat-
tention for nonlinear pricing in dynamic environments. Findings are: (1)
Three-part tariffs, such as cellular service contracts, exploit consumer over-
confidence. (2) Surprise penalty fees may be used to further exploit biased
beliefs or alternatively to price discriminate more efficiently whenever con-
sumers are inattentive. (3) Implementing the recent bill-shock agreement
between cellular carriers and the FCC is predicted to harm rather than help
consumers when endogenous price changes are taken into account.
Keywords: nonlinear pricing, dynamic, inattention, overconfidence, bill
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1. Introduction
Nonlinear pricing schemes, such as volume discounts, are important tools
for converting consumer surplus into profits. In the large literature on nonlin-
ear pricing, models are predominantly static. Nevertheless, nonlinear pricing
often arises in dynamic environments where consumer purchase decisions are
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spread out over time. For instance, a cellular phone customer in the US
must first choose a calling plan, which typically involves trading off higher
monthly fees with larger buckets of included minutes. Only later does the
consumer choose how many calls to make, which is done on a call-by-call
basis throughout the course of a month. In such a dynamic environment,
consumer behavior depends importantly both on expectations about future
consumption patterns (such as when choosing a calling plan) and on con-
sumer recall about past consumption (such as when trying to recall if one
has already exhausted an allowance of included minutes).
Recent research provides compelling evidence from consumer behavior
and firm pricing that our standard assumptions of rational expectations and
perfect recall are both unrealistic and unsatisfactory for understanding non-
linear pricing in such dynamic environments. I review three recent papers
that highlight the importance of modeling and measuring both bias and inat-
tention to understand firms’ pricing decisions and evaluate public policies
such as the Federal Communication Commission’s (FCC) recent bill-shock
agreement with cellular carriers (Grubb, 2009, 2011; Grubb and Osborne,
2011).1
In Grubb (2009) I show that consumer overconfidence can explain why
cellular phone service plans include ‘free’ minutes followed by steep over-
1Each of the papers reviewed here discusses related work on dynamic nonlinear pricing.
Moreover, Rochet and Stole (2003, Section 8) survey dynamic nonlinear pricing models
with standard consumers, such as Courty and Li (2000). Spiegler (2011) surveys models
with nonstandard consumers, such as DellaVigna and Malmendier (2004) and Eliaz and
Spiegler (2008).
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age fees. The paper highlights the importance of consumers’ expectations
about future consumption at the time of contracting but still assumes that
there is single consumption choice after a contract is signed. Two more re-
cent papers relax this assumption by recognizing that consumption choices
themselves are spread out over time. Consumer recall of past consumption
becomes important in this environment, which allows me to examine the role
of consumer inattention and its proposed remedy: bill-shock alerts that no-
tify consumers when they reach consumption thresholds. In Grubb (2011)
I show that bill-shock regulation will harm some consumers and lower total
welfare in fairly competitive markets if consumers are inattentive but unbi-
ased, but that such regulation can be beneficial if consumers underestimate
their own future demand. In Grubb and Osborne (2011) we structurally esti-
mate consumer biases from cellular-phone billing-data and counterfactually
simulate the effect of implementing the recent bill-shock agreement between
cellular carriers and the FCC. Initial results suggest that the agreement will
be bad for consumers on average, assuming risk neutrality, although it will
lower bill volatility.
2. Selling to Overconfident Consumers
Firms commonly offer three-part tariffs, or a menu of three-part tariffs,
in a variety of contexts. A three-part tariff consists of a fixed fee, an included
allowance of units for which marginal price is zero, and a positive marginal
price for additional usage beyond the allowance. A prime example is cellular
phone service pricing in the US. The standard literature on nonlinear pricing
does not provide a compelling explanation for such pricing patterns. Under
3
perfect competition one expects price to be driven down to cost, while stan-
dard nonlinear pricing models suggest the highest demand consumer will pay
the lowest marginal price.
In Grubb (2009), I develop two theoretical explanations for observed
three-part tariffs. The first explanation maintains the standard common-
prior assumption and is based on price discrimination, while the second re-
lies on consumer overconfidence. Using cellular phone customer billing data,
I rule out the first explanation and conclude that overconfidence is a good
explanation for three-part tariff pricing in the cellular context.2
At the heart of both explanations developed in Grubb (2009) is the recog-
nition of one dynamic element of pricing: consumers must choose a calling
plan when they are still uncertain about their future calling needs. The first
potential explanation for three-part tariffs has the flavor of standard price
discrimination, but consumers are separated based on the level of their un-
certainty about future consumption rather than purely on the level of their
demand. The second explanation is that consumers tend to underestimate
the variance of their future demand when choosing a tariff.
Two important biases lead to the tendency of consumers to underestimate
the variance of their future demand: forecasting overconfidence (sometimes
called overprecision), which has been well documented in the psychology lit-
2Eliaz and Spiegler (2006) show that menus of three-part tariffs may be used to screen
consumers with varying degrees of awareness about their own time-inconsistency. While I
assume consumers buy all units from a single seller, Chao (2011) assumes that consumers
buy from multiple sellers and argues that a dominant firm may use a three-part tariff to
accommodate a competitor.
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erature, and projection bias, which is described by Loewenstein et al. (2003).
To understand the distinction, assume that in each period t consumer i real-
izes θit = µi+εit potential calling opportunities (measured in minutes) where
µi is consumer i’s average number of calling opportunities and εit captures
volatility month-to-month. Moreover, assume that consumers do not know
their own average tastes µi but form beliefs after receiving a noisy signal.
Forecasting overconfidence implies a consumer will underestimate his own
uncertainty about his average tastes µi. Projection bias implies that a con-
sumer will underestimate the volatility of her tastes over time (the variance
of εit). The two biases are isomorphic in the context of Grubb (2009) because
the paper models a single consumption period and hence only beliefs about
θi1 matter. (The two biases are distinguished in Grubb and Osborne (2011)
which models consumer learning about average tastes µi using panel data.)
Intuitively, underestimating variance of future demand can lead to three-
part tariff pricing because consumers do not take into account the risk in-
herent in the convexity of the tariffs on the menu. This is because although
the tariffs have a high average cost per unit for consumers who consume
far above or far below their allowance, consumers are overly certain that
they will choose a tariff with an allowance that closely matches their own
consumption. (According to a pricing manager at a top US cellular phone
service provider, “people absolutely think they know how much they will use
and it’s pretty surprising how wrong they are.” (Grubb, 2009)) Thus con-
sumers expect to pay a low average price per unit, but sellers profit ex post
when consumers make large revisions in either direction.
Grubb (2009) introduces a panel of billing records spanning February
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2002 through June 2005 for approximately 2300 student accounts managed
by a major US university for a national US cellular phone service provider. I
find that customer tariff choices and subsequent usage decisions are just what
would be expected from overconfident consumers. Moreover, usage patterns
suggest that the overconfidence explanation is more appropriate than the
price discrimination explanation in this particular application. Specifically,
the distribution of usage by customers on a plan with a large number of
included minutes strictly first order stochastically dominates (FOSD) the
distribution of usage by customers on a plan with a small number of included
minutes. This is inconsistent with the price discrimination model given three-
part tariff pricing. (The price discrimination model predicts that firms offer
the ‘free’ minutes inherent in three-part tariffs only when cumulative usage
distributions cross, which is ruled out by FOSD.)
A simple example from Grubb (2009) illustrates the role of overconfidence.
Assume that firm marginal costs are 5 cents per minute and fixed costs are
$50 per customer. Consumers value each minute of calling at 45 cents up
to some satiation point, beyond which they have no additional value for
calling. When consumers sign contracts at time one, they are homogeneously
uncertain about their satiation points. Then, at time two, consumers learn
their satiation points and make their consumption choices. In particular,
one third of consumers learn that they will be satiated after 100 minutes,
one third after 400 minutes, and the remaining third after 700 minutes.
If consumers and the firm share this prior belief, then it is optimal for
the firm to charge a marginal price equal to the marginal cost of 5 cents
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per minute.3 A monopolist extracts all the surplus via a fixed fee of $160,
earning profits of $110 per customer. Under perfect competition, the firm
charges a fixed fee of $50, leaving $110 in surplus to consumers.
If consumers are overconfident, however, marginal cost pricing is no longer
optimal. For instance, if all consumers are extremely overconfident and be-
lieve that they will be satiated after 400 minutes with probability one, then it
is optimal to charge 0 cents per minute for the first 400 minutes, and 45 cents
per minute thereafter. In other words it is optimal to have 400 ”included”
minutes in the tariff.
A monopolist charges a fixed fee of $180, earning expected profits of $155
per customer. Ex ante, consumers expect to receive zero surplus, but on
average ex post realize a loss of $45. Under perfect competition, the firm
charges a fixed fee of $25, and consumers expect to receive $155 in surplus,
but actually only realize $110. Consumer overconfidence allows the creation
ex ante of an additional $45 in perceived consumer surplus, which is never
realized ex post.
To see why this tariff is optimal, consider the pricing of minutes 100-400
and 400-700 separately. On the one hand, overconfident consumers believe
that they will consume minutes 100-400 with probability 1, while the firm
knows that they will actually consume them only with probability 2
3
. As a
result, reducing the marginal price of minutes 100-400 from 5 cents to 0 cents
is perceived differently by the firm and consumer. The consumer views this
as a $15 price cut and will be indifferent if the fixed fee is increased by $15.
3In a richer setting marginal cost pricing would be uniquely optimal.
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The firm, however, recognizes this as only a $10 revenue loss, and will be
better off by $5 if the fixed fee is raised by $15.
On the other hand, overconfident consumers believe that they will con-
sume minutes 400-700 with probability 0, while the firm knows that they will
actually consume them with probability 1
3
. Therefore from the consumer’s
perspective, increasing the marginal price of minutes 400-700 from 5 cents to
45 cents does not impact the expected price paid. The firm, however, views
this as an increase in expected revenues of $40.
Essentially, the firm finds it optimal to sell the first 400 minutes upfront to
overconfident consumers. Then in the second period, low demand consumers
use only 100 minutes but don’t receive a refund for their unused allowance,
while high demand consumers buy minutes 400-700 at the monopoly price of
45 cents per minute.
3. Bill Shock: Inattention and Price-Posting Regulation
In late 2011, US President Barack Obama said that,
Far too many Americans know what it’s like to open up their
cell-phone bill and be shocked by hundreds or even thousands of
dollars in unexpected fees and charges. But we can put an end to
that with a simple step: an alert warning consumers that they’re
about to hit their limit before fees and charges add up.
Obama’s statement was made at the announcement of a voluntary agree-
ment between cellular carriers and the FCC to begin providing such usage
alerts by April 2013 (CTIA - The Wireless Association, 2011).
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The situation Obama refers to, known as bill shock, can arise even when
consumers are fully informed about contract terms. For example, a cellular-
phone customer may know that the first 400 minutes are included while
later minutes are charged at an overage rate of forty-five cents per minute.
Nevertheless, he may be uncertain whether the next call will cost zero cents or
forty-five cents because he does not know how many minutes he has already
used. Such marginal-price uncertainty at the point of sale occurs whenever
marginal prices vary with the level of consumption and, due to inattention,
consumers are unaware of their past consumption when making additional
consumption choices. Thus similar bill-shock regulation might be relevant to
a wide variety of products and services including electricity, health insurance,
and debit and credit-card transactions. For instance US checking account
holders are often uncertain at the point of sale whether or not a $35 overdraft
fee will apply if they have not kept track of their bank balance and this could
be addressed via balance alert regulation.4
Obama describes the new bill-shock agreement as part of his Adminis-
tration’s “ongoing efforts to protect American consumers by making sure
financial transactions are fair, honest and transparent” (CTIA - The Wire-
less Association, 2011). Holding pricing fixed, usage alerts should at least
weakly benefit consumers as Obama assumes by giving them more informa-
tion to make better choices. However, firms will change prices in response to
new disclosure requirements and it is therefore worth asking whether the bill-
shock agreement or similar bill-shock regulation in other contexts will help
4Since 2010, American consumers must have opted-in to overdraft protection to be in
this situation.
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consumers or raise total welfare. This is the goal of two recent papers: Grubb
(2011) models the effects of consumer inattention and bill-shock regulation
theoretically and Grubb and Osborne (2011) evaluates bill-shock regulation
in the specific context of cellular phones via structural estimation and coun-
terfactual simulation.
To understand the effect of bill-shock regulation one must understand the
answer to a related question: Why do firms both charge penalty fees (so that
high usage triggers high marginal charges) and make them a surprise by not
alerting consumers when they cross the relevant threshold?5
In Grubb (2011) I model consumer consumption choices and firm pricing
responses when consumers are inattentive to past consumption and are aware
of their own inattention when forecasting their future consumption choices.6
I show that there are at least two reasons for firms to charge inattentive
consumers surprise penalty fees for excessive usage: First, surprise penalty
fees can be useful for price discrimination. Second, surprise penalty fees can
be useful for exploiting biases in consumer beliefs. Thus either heterogeneity
or bias in consumer expectations at the time of contracting can explain both
firms’ use of surprise penalty fees and their resistance to regulation.
5Prior to its agreement with the FCC, the wirelesss industry trade group C.T.I.A. - The
Wireless Association opposed proposed bill-shock regulation on the grounds that it “vi-
olates carriers’ First Amendment protections. . . . against government compelled speech”
(Altschul et al., 2011).
6Liebman and Zeckhauser (2004) analyze optimal pricing for consumers who confuse
average price with marginal price (ironing) and for consumers who myopically consider
only the marginal price of the current unit (spotlighting). In contrast, I assume consumers
make choices optimally conditional on their limited memory.
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Whether firms’ use of surprise penalty fees is motivated by price discrim-
ination concerns or their value in exploiting consumer bias matters for the
consequences of regulation. I first consider the case in which consumers are
unbiased ex ante but may have either a low or a high expectation about
their future demand. A surprising result is that the combination of surprise
penalty fees and consumer inattention can be socially valuable (as well as pri-
vately valuable to firms) and benefit some consumers by reducing allocative
distortions imposed by price discriminating firms. Moreover this is always
the case in fairly competitive markets. In the cellular context, firms clearly
use packages of included minutes followed by overage charges to price dis-
criminate across low and high usage segments. The implication is therefore
that implementing the recent bill-shock agreement will hurt some consumers
and lower total welfare if the cellular services market is fairly competitive
and consumers are unbiased.
The intuition for the result that bill-shock regulation can harm some con-
sumers and lower total welfare follows in two parts. Part one of the intuition
is the standard logic of price discrimination with standard consumers: Sup-
pose that if a firm could practice third-degree price discrimination it would
offer low-usage consumers a discounted markup via a discounted fixed fee.
When consumers self select contracts the firm must ensure that high-usage
consumers are not tempted to choose a contract with a discounted markup
intended for low-usage consumers. Thus, to offer low-usage consumers a
discounted markup and discounted fixed fee, some marginal prices must be
raised above marginal cost on the discounted contract to encourage high-
usage consumers to pay a higher markup and fixed fee. When consumers are
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attentive, this necessarily means that allocations will be distorted downwards
inefficiently.
Part two of the intuition points out an important difference when con-
sumers are inattentive: Price changes that keep expected marginal price
equal to marginal cost remain efficient. For instance, assume marginal cost
is five cents per minute and consider a contract that offers included minutes
at zero marginal price followed by a surprise overage rate of fifty cents per
minute. If consumers anticipate overages one in five months, then the ex-
pected marginal price is five cents and allocations are efficient. Nevertheless,
this price structure can still encourage a higher-volume consumer (who would
make an overage more than one in five months on the contract and hence face
a higher expected marginal price) to pay a higher fixed fee and markup for a
contract charging five cents per minute. Thus the combination of inattention
and surprise penalty fees can allow firms to charge different markups without
distorting allocations. Bill-shock regulation removes this option and forces
firms to impose standard allocative distortions to price discriminate, thereby
reducing total welfare. Because of this inefficiency, price discrimination is
less profitable and firms will charge different customer groups more similar
markups. This means raising markups for low-volume customers who are un-
ambiguously worse off but lowering markups for high-volume consumers - the
only group to benefit from the regulation. Nevertheless, consumer advocacy
groups who do not take into account firms’ price response to the regulation
would be expected to advocate for it strongly - since holding prices fixed all
consumers would be made better off.
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Because Grubb (2009) finds evidence that cellular consumers are biased,
I also examine the role of bill-shock regulation when consumers are homoge-
neous but biased. In this case firms use surprise penalty fees to exploit con-
sumers’ bias. Bill-shock regulation limits revenues from penalty fees because
it helps consumers avoid accidental overages. Under monopoly this means
that bill-shock regulation serves its intended role of consumer protection by
limiting monopoly rents. In an oligopoly, however, if firms compete on fixed
fees then bill-shock regulation will not effect equilibrium markups and con-
sumers are residual claimants of social surplus. (Revenues from penalty fees
are always rebated through lower fixed fees.) Moreover, whether the regula-
tion will increase or decrease total welfare (and hence help or hurt consumers)
will depend finely on the level of marginal costs and the nature of consumer
bias. As a result, the total effect of bill-shock regulation in the cellular mar-
ket is an empirical question, explored further in Grubb and Osborne (2011).
However, Grubb (2011) shows that if fixed fees have already been competed
down to zero, such as in the case of the US checking account market where
free checking prevails, then bill-shock regulation can be expected to reduce
equilibrium markups and benefit consumers if account holders underestimate
the frequency of paying penalties (overdrafting). This result suggests that
US checking account holders could benefit substantially if regulators moved
beyond the recent adoption of opt-in regulation for overdraft fees to requiring
zero-balance alerts.
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4. Cellular Service Demand: Biased Beliefs, Learning, and Bill
Shock
Whether or not the recent bill-shock agreement will benefit consumers
or be welfare improving depends on a number of factors including biases in
consumer beliefs. It is therefore an empirical question whether the regula-
tion will be good or bad. In Grubb and Osborne (2011), we develop and
estimate a dynamic model of calling plan choice and calling usage using the
panel of individuals’ phone bills introduced in Grubb (2009). We identify the
distribution of consumers’ true demand for cellular calls from their actual us-
age. In addition, we identify consumers’ beliefs about their future demand
from their calling plan choices. The joint distribution of beliefs and realized
demand determine whether beliefs are biased in the population. Moreover,
we estimate the rate at which consumers learn about their own average de-
mand overtime and switch plans to lower their bills. Given our estimates,
we are able to make counterfactual simulations of bill-shock regulation and
consumer de-biasing.7
We show that consumers are responsive to marginal prices (calling jumps
at 9pm when off-peak hours begin) but do not adjust calling behavior through-
out the billing cycle. Our explanation is that consumers are inattentive to
their own past usage. (An attentive consumer would cut back calling fol-
lowing a period of high usage, and would do so more strongly if the period
7Most closely related are Goettler and Clay (2010), which measures consumer bias in
the online grocery-delivery market, and Jiang (2011), which analyzes bill-shock regulation
but assumes consumers are unbiased.
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of high usage arose within the current billing cycle. We find no evidence
of such behavior.) We therefore assume that consumers use a constant-
threshold strategy, making all calls valued above a chosen level v∗.8 This
threshold is constant throughout the month because consumers do not keep
track of past usage and hence cannot condition calling behavior on past us-
age. By following this approach, our’s is the first empirical model which can
endogenously incorporate the information arrival due to usage alerts under
a bill-shock regulation regime.
Our estimates show that consumers underestimate their own uncertainty
about future calling demand. In Grubb (2009), I note that this may arise
from forecasting overconfidence or projection bias but do not distinguish
the two causes, often referring to both together as overconfidence. How-
ever, using consumers’ switching behavior we are able to separately identify
forecasting overconfidence and projection bias as two distinct biases and re-
serve the term overconfidence only for the first. Our preliminary estimates
are that consumers underestimate their own uncertainty about their aver-
age demand by 82% (overconfidence) and that consumers underestimate the
monthly volatility of their demand by 54% (projection bias). The relative
magnitudes of the two biases are identified by consumers’ low rate of switch-
ing and shed light, for instance, on the success of AT&T’s roll-over minutes
pricing which exploits overconfidence but not projection bias.
Holding prices fixed, our counter factual simulations show that bill-shock
regulation increases consumer welfare about $21 per customer per year. No-
8Grubb (2011) shows that this is the optimal strategy for an inattentive consumer.
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tably, we find that the large effect is due to the presence of bias. When all
biases are removed, the effect drops to less than $2 per customer per year. Of
course holding prices fixed is unrealistic. In our endogenous price counter-
factual simulations, preliminary results show that consumer welfare falls by
about $25 per person. Consumers reduce calling after receiving alerts that
they have exceeded their allowance of minutes. As a result, overage revenues
fall. Equilibrium markups are not affected, however, as firms make up the
difference through higher fixed fees. Thus consumers make fewer phone calls
but end up paying the same amount, so are worse off. This suggests that
the long run effect of implementing the recent bill-shock agreement could be
negative for consumers.
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